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Summary findings
James summarizes the major findings and  in the report.  Researchers have begun to quantify the
recommendations in Averting the Old Age Crisis,  effects of a full or partial shift to a funded defined-
describing problems in traditional  pension systems and  contribution  plan on the supply and allocation of labor,
proposals for reform. Then she describes how those  on national saving, and on the development of financial
reforms are being implemented in many countries and  markets.
examines empirical evidence about pension reform's  Results from the studies that have been done so far on
impact on growth.  the (anticipated and actual) effects of pension reform (in
Since the publication of Averting the Old Age Crisis,  Argentina, Australia, Mexico, Switzerland, the United
the move toward multipillar systems has accelerated  Kingdom, the United States, and especially Chile) suggest
around the world, spurred by demographic and  that pension reform can have and has had a positive,
economic forces.  possibly large, impact on national saving and the
In addition, research has been carried out on some of  development of financial markets and hence on
the critical assumptions underlying the recommendations  economic growth.
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Over the next 35 years, the proportion of the world's population that is
over age 60  will nearly double, from 9%  to 16% (Figure  1)  . Due to  rapid increases
in life expectancy and declines in fertility rates, populations are aging much
faster in  developing countries than  they did in industrial  countries (Figure  2).
As young working-age people near retirement--around the year 2030--80% of the
world's old people will live in what today are developing countries. Therefore,
these countries need to begin thinking about how they will care for their older
populations. And, given their rapid aging, it is essential that they get this
right from the  start. The  World Bank report  on old  age security,  Avertinq the  Old
Age Crisis, was prepared with this need in mind. In this paper I summarize its
major findings  and discuss  some  of the  pension reforms  and  empirical studies  that
have been carried out since that report was written.
Population aging is welcome because it indicates that many people have an
opportunity to live longer and healthier lives. But it also creates problems,
because the working age population must now support a growing number of people
who are no longer actively generating economic output. And it generates fiscal
pressures for the government.
While  the  informal  family  system  cares  for  the  old  in  traditional
societies, as economic development and urbanization proceed the family support
system breaks down and formal systems,  often  publicly financed, take  over. These
formal  systems  typically  provide  a  stream  of  income,  called  pensions  or
annuities, to old people in lieu of wages or family support. Cross-sectional
analysis shows that coverage under formal pension plans is closely tied to per
capita  income  and  public  spending  on  pensions  increase  exponentially  as
populations age. It now exceeds 15% of GNP in some industrialized countries and
will do so in  many more countries  as  the  demographic transition  proceeds (Figures
3 and 4).
With such large sums involved, how this money is generated and spent can
affect  the entire economy, by  influencing factor supplies, productivity and
1therefore the size of the GNP pie. For example, it appears that countries with
higher private pension spending  and assets  have lower  public spending, and these
two types of spending may have different effects on the broader economy (Figure
5). Therefore, we argue that two over-arching criteria should be used to shape
and evaluate these programs: they should protect the old (in  an equitable way)
and they should promote  (or at  least not hinder) economic growth--which  is
important both for the old and the young.
Since growing old is a predictable life experience, that most of us will
have with a high probability, a large part of old age security can be provided
by self-insurance--people saving  for  themselves, shifting  consumption from  their
younger productive years to their older years when consumption exceeds income.
This reduces  many of the incentive  problems associated with taxes, transfers and
insurance. But another part of old age security systems requires pooling risks
and  insuring or redistributing across individuals--because some people  will
retire early due to  disability, die young  and leave  dependents, live longer than
average and run out of resources, or earn very low lifetime incomes which are
insufficient to support them for their nonworking as well as their non-working
lives.
Averting the Old Age Crisis recommends that a combination of mandatory
self-insurance and insurance  across individuals should  be used, in a system that
puts greater  emphasis on saving, that has separate financing and managerial
mechanisms for  redistribution and saving,  and that shares  responsibility between
the private and public sectors. Although structural change is always difficult,
the  experience  of countries  that  have  already instituted  these  reforms  shows that
it is  possible, but it  takes somewhat  different  forms in  different  countries, and
it usually  involves spreading the transition costs by swapping implicit  for
explicit debt that is gradually paid off over several generations. Preliminary
evidence suggests a large positive impact on growth.
Trhis  paper  describes the almost universal problems we  found with  the
dominant system  today, sets  forth  our recommendations  for  the  system of  tomorrow,
2discusses the  way these reforms  are now being implemented in  many countries, and
examines empirical evidence on the growth impact of pension reform.
I. The Problems
Most formal systems of old age security today are publicly managed, pay
"defined  benefits"  that  depend  on  the  worker's  earnings, rather  than
contributions, and are finaniced  by payroll taxes on a  pay-as-you-go (PAYG)  basis
--meaning that today's workers are taxed to pay the pensions of those who have
already retired. Averting the Old  Age Crisis documents in great detail the many
problems we found with these systems. These problems include:
high and rising payroll tax rates that may increase unemployment;
evasion and escape  to the informal sector, where workers may be  less
productive;
early retirement, which reduces the supply of experienced labor;
misallocation of public resources, as scarce tax revenues are used for
pensions rather than for education, health or infrastructure;
lost opportunity to increase long term saving, which are considered to be
too low in many countries;
failure to redistribute to low income groups;
unintended inter-generational  transfers (often  to high income  groups); and
the growth of a large hidden implicit  public pension debt which, together
with the  abuses mentioned above,  makes  the current system financially  non-
sustainable in many countries.
As  a result, existing systems have not always protected  the old, they
especially  will not protect those  who  grow old in  the future, they  often have not
distributed their benefits in  an equitable way, and they have hindered economic
growth. In addition, they are simply not sustainable in their present form.
Now, each of these problems was not found in every country, but every
country we  examined--both developing  and  industrialized--exhibited  most of these
problems.  This led us to believe that these problems were not accidental, but
3rather they were inherent in the economics and politics of PAYG defined benefit
schemes, which make it easy for  politicians to promise short run benefits at the
expense of large long run costs. A new system is needed that is more immune to
these dangers.
II. The Recommended Multi-Pillar System
In place of existing systems, Averting recommends a multi-pillar system
that is  partially funded, that  utilizes  private management of these funds (which
constitute peoples' retirement savings), and that has a separate public tax-
financed mechanism for redistributing to low income workers. Specifically, our
preferred system contains three pillars (Figure  6):
a mandatory publicly-managed tax-financed pillar for redistribution,
a mandatory privately-managed fully funded pillar for saving, and
a  voluntary pillar for people who want more protection for old age.
The first pillar would resemble existing public pension plans in that it
would  be  publicly managed,  defined  benefit (DB)  and  tax-financed.  However,  unlike
most current systems, the  reformed  public pillar would focus  on redistribution--
providing a social safety net for the old, particularly the old whose lifetime
incoine  was  low.  This  reco.fmmendation  is  based  on  a  value  judgement  that
redistribution  to  alleviate  poverty  is  socially  desirable  and  a  technical
recognition that redistribution is the function that uniquely requires public
financing and control; for everything else, we must give careful attention to
market alternatives. The benefit formula could  be flat (uniform  for everyone or
related  to  years of  covered employment),  as in  Argentina and the  U.K., means- and
asset-tested (as  in Australia) or could provide a minimum pension guarantee  (as
in Chile). Holding the flat benefit and minimum guarantee equivalent, the last
alternative is  obviously  cheaper  while  the  first  provides  additional co-insurance
and  redistribution to lower  middle class  workers. The tax  base should  be as  broad
as possible--such as general revenue finance  where coverage is almost universal
(as  in industrialized countries),  or  a  payroll tax  with a  high ceiling on taxable
4earnings where coverage is limited (as  in most developing countries).  Because
of its limited scope and broad tax base, tax rates to support this pillar would
be much lower and less distortionary than the public system requires in most
countries today.
The second  pillar would differ  dramatically from  most existing systems. It
would be mandatory, would link benefits actuarially to contributions as in a
defined  contribution  (DC) plan,  where  contributions  and  investment  income
accumulate and  eventually are converted into  the  person's retirement annuity. It
would be fully funded  and the  funds  would  be  privately and  competitively managed.
Essentially, people would be required to save for their  old age, and this pillar
would handle their savings. Let me explain the reasons why a mandatory defined
contribution funded privately-managed pillar should be an important part of an
old age system.
Why mandatory? For the same reason that current systems are mandatory--
because a significant number of people may be shortsighted, may not save enough
for their old age on a voluntary basis, and may become a burden on society at
large when they grow old.
Why link benefits to contributions? To discourage evasion, escape to the
informal sector and other labor  market distortions, since  people are less likely
to regard their contribution as a tax. And those who do evade bear the cost in
the  form of  lower benefits  rather than passing  the costs on  to others  and
undermining  the  financial  viability  of  the  scheme,  as  when  benefits  and
contributions are not closely linked. For similar reasons, defined contribution
plans are likely to  deter early  retirement  and to  raise the  normal retirement age
automatically as longevity increases--without a difficult political decision.
Why fully funded? First, to make costs clear up front so countries won't
be tempted to make promises today that they will be unable to keep tomorrow.
Unrealistic benefit rates have often been set at the beginning of PAYG schemes
because their costs are hidden and  postponed, but as the years pass these costs
become  much  more  prominent,  they  increase exponentially  and  countries find
themselves  saddled with a huge fiscal burden.  Full funding from the start
5diminishes the future tax increases that will be needed, gives a reality-check
to pension promises and thereby helps to avoid this dilemma.
Second, funding prevents inadvertently large intergenerational transfers
from young people to older workers.  Once an unfunded system is set in motion,
intergenerational transfers occur automatically as a result of the aging and
maturation process, sometimes in ways that people did not expect and would not
have chosen after an open discussion.  For example, because of the benefit and
financing formulas commonly used, some of the gainers are rich people in the
earlier generations while  some of  the losers  are poor  people  in the  later
generations. Full funding eliminates such inter-generational transfers, unless
an explicit decision is made to give them.
Third, full funding for the second pillar may be used to help build long
term  national savings and to help finance future  pensions out of the returns to
this saving.  It is sometimes argued that savings are  irrelevant to  old age
security because the consumption  of future retirees can  only be supported by the
output of future workers.  However, this common belief is overly simplistic:
savings can enhance the  productivity and therefore the  output of future  workers,
they can be imbedded in consumer durables that continue to provide a stream of
services, and they can be invested  abroad, then redeemed  to finance an inflow of
consumer goods.  Thus, saving can be  an  important ingredient of a  long  run
strategy for providing additional domestic consumption when the dependency rate
increases. Additional  saving is especially important in countries where  the
saving rate is relatively low to begin with, because of myopia or distortionary
taxes on investment returns.
Why  privately  managed? To  maximize the  likelihood  that  economic  rather than
political objectives will determine the investment strategy, thereby producing
the best allocation of capital and the highest return on savings; and to help
countries (especially  middle income  countries) develop their financial markets.
The  experience of  many  countries, including  countries  that  are  now in  transition,
indicates that  governments are  not the  best allocators of  national capital. More
specifically, the available data show that publicly managed pension reserves
6fared  poorly and in  many cases lost  money throughout the 1980's--Largely  because
public managers were required to invest in government securities or loans to
failing state enterprises, at low nominal interest rates that became negative
real rates during inflationary  periods (Figure  7).  Clearly  this poses  a problem
for the pension funds.
It also poses a problem for the economy as a whole  if the hidden and
exclusive access to these funds makes it easier for governments to run large
deficits or to spend more wastefully than they could if they had to rely on a
more accountable source 'of  funds. Even if the current government is fiscally
responsible future governments may not be, and the accessibility of publicly
managed  pension  reserves enables them to  spend without  taxing or borrowing
through the market.
Competitively managed funded pension plans, in contrast, are more likely
to be invested in a mixture of public and corporate bonds, eqlities and real
estate, thereby earning a higher rate of return. Governments can still borrow,
but they do so through the market in a more transparent way. Private pension
funds  can  enjoy  the  benefits  of  investment  diversification,  including
international diversification, that enables them to increase their yield and
reduce their risk, by protecting them from inflation  and other country-specific
risks. They  spur financial market development, by creating a demand for new
financial instruments and institutions. These private pension funds could take
the  form  of personal  saving plans  where  the worker  chooses  the investment
manager, as in Chile and Argentina, or of occupational plans where the employer
and/or union chooses, as in  Australia, Switzerland,  Denmark and the  Netherlands.
(But  two  caveats: countries  must have  at least  rudimentary capital  markets
before they can put  the funded pillar in place, and considerable government
regulation  and  regulatory capacity are need  in  order  to prevent  fraud  and
excessive risk. These caveats mean that some countries must move very slowly
toward a funded pillar for  mandatory retirement saving;  but these same countries
would probably abuse a large PAYG public pillar. The best course for them is to
7continue to rely heavily on the informal family system, while building their
formal old age programs slowly and carefully.)
A third pillar, voluntary saving and annuities, would offer supplemental
retirement income for people with the means and inclination to save more. An
important  public policy issue here: Should governments offer tax incentives for
voluntary saving  and annuities:  The  answer  depends  on  whether such incentives  are
consistent with the  country's over-all tax policy toward consumption  versus
saving, since special incentives for  retirement  accounts could otherwise lead to
a shift of assets, with no net increase in voluntary saving for the individual
or for the economy as a whole.
All three pillars would co-insure against the many risks that old people
face. For example, each pillar could include a mechanism for handling specific
risks, such as the risks of disability, early death with survivors and above
average longevity--or else insurance against these risks could be concentrated
in  one of  the mandatory  pillars.  Most important,  all  three  pillars together would
co-insure  against  the  generalized  risk  stemming  from  uncertainty  about the  future
economy or polity--such as breakdowns of the government or  the market, changes
in relative prices of labor and capital, deterioration in the position of a
particular  country--by diversifying  across  types of  management  (public and
private), sources of finance (from  labor and capital) and investment strategies
(equities and  bonds,  domestic  and  international).  Risk  diversification  is
especially important  given the  long time  periods and  great uncertainty involved.
Whatever unpredictable disasters occur in  the future--as they surely will--this
diversified system is  most likely to continue  providing protection for the old,
according  to the old adage--don't put  all your  eggs  in one basket.  (For  a
quantification of the welfare gains from diversification see Pujol 1996). In
fact, most upper income people have very diversified sources of old age income,
including privately managed investment income, while lower income groups have
been forced  to be rely  heavily  on publicly  managed  PAYG  programs. We believe that
the national mandatory plan  should also give these lower  income groups  the
benefits of risk diversification.
8Political implications. Finally,  it  would be naive to ignore the fact  that
the  partial replacement of a  publicly managed  program by  privately managed funds
also has political and ideological implications.  It  changes the  balance of power
in society,  taking influence and  jobs away from bureaucrats and others who
control the public  programs and  shifting them to private entrepreneurs.  It
inculcates the ethos of personal.  responsibility and makes each worker a little
capitalist--which may be good or bad, depending on your point of view. While
AvertinQ the Old Age Crisis and this paper concentrate on the economic factors,
these political and ideological factors probably have much to do with the way
pension  reform  has been  received and  whether  or not  it has  succeeded,  in
different countries.
III. How Have Countries Reformed? How Have They Financed the Transition?
During the past decade, with the pace accelerating during the past five
years, several countries  have adopted  variations on this  multi-pillar system. We
have  learned  from this experience that pension  reform is possible,  even  in
democracies, but it takes somewhat different forms in different countries, as a
result of  their different initial conditions  (e.g. how  large was  their old
implicit pension debt) and  political economies (e.g.  how strong  are their social
security bureaucrats, pensioner organizations and labor unions?). For example,
these factors led Argentina to choose a relatively large  public pillar while in
Peru there is no public pillar at all, at  present. They led Chile and Australia
to choose a much larger private pillar than Mexico. Further, in Chile the terms
of trade (i.e.  the benefit and contribution rates under the two systems and the
terms of the recognition.  bonds) made it very attractive for workers to switch
when given a choice, while this is less the case in Colombia and Peru.
I will  refer in this section to the implicit pension  debt  (IPD)--the
present value of the  pension promises that are  owed to current  pensioners and to
workers according to their years of participation in the old system. The IPD is
inherent in DB PAYG systems,  where workers expect to get a specified pension in
9return for their contributions, but assets are not accumulated to cover this;
instead the obligation is covered by implicit IOU's of the government.  (This
contrasts with funded DC systems, where pensions are fully covered by assets).
The IPD  exceeds the explicit debt (backed  by government bonds) in  many countries
and exceeds 200% of GNP in some cases (Figure  8 and Table 1). It is especially
large in countries with high coverage,  generous benefits and older populations.
Since governments cannot easily renege on these obligations, they have a large
impact on whether and how countries have reformed; reform often converts  (part
of) the  IPD into explicit debt. Most developing countries have  small  IPD's
because of their low coverage rates,  and are therefore in the enviable position
of being able to change their systems before the debt becomes unmanageable.
The  Latin  American  versus  the  OECD  models.  Broadly  speaking,  three
different  approaches  toward  structural  reform  may  be  discerned--the  Latin
American model, the "bold"  OECD model (Australia,  Switzerland, Denmark and the
U.K.)  and  the  "partial"  European  model  (Sweden, Italy,  Latvia,  the  Czech
Republic). The Latin  American model  was pioneered  by  Chile in 1980  and,  bolstered
by its initial  success,  was closely  followed  by  Argentina, Peru,  Colombia,  Mexico
and Uruguay  in the  1990's. It  is now under  consideration  in Nicaragua,  El
Salvador, Bolivia and Costa Rica. In this model, workers get to choose  the
investment managers of their own individual accounts.
By comparison, in the OECD model, where many employer-sponsored pension
plans have long  existed  on a  voluntary basis,  they have  become the foundation for
the mandatory second  pillar and a combination  of employer and  union trustees get
to choose the investment manager for each company or occupational group as a
whole. (In  the  U.K. a hybrid model exists--employers are  permitted to opt out of
the state earnings-related  plan, while workers are permitted to opt out of their
employer's plan in favor of their own personal retirement plan).
As  another important difference--most of the OECD countries with bold
reforms had a modest redistributive public pillar with a small IPD when they
started their new system, so they could simply retain it and start the second
pillar on top of that. The second pillar immediately became mandatory for all
10covered workers. (In  the U.K. and Denmnark,  a partial phase-out or downsizing of
the  earnings-related state  plan is  involved,  but  the  basic flat  benefit remains).
In contrast, the Latin American countries had bloated public pillars and
high contribution rates to start  out.  Thus,  the second  pillar  had to replace  part
of the public pillar and the latter had to be downsized and redesigned. When a
worker switched to  the new system,  he was given credit  for  his past service  under
the old system  (as  by recognition bonds in Chile or compensatory pensions in
Argentina), while part of his future contributions  were diverted to the second
pillar of the new system. How could these countries find the money to continue
paying the promised benefits to current pensioners and older workers (the IPD)
under the old system, while part of the payroll tax flowing in was diverted to
funded individual accounts? This revenue  gap has become known as the problem of
"financing the transition."
Financing the transition in the Latin model. Some of the strategies that
have been used in the Latin American countries to finance the transition are:
1. Before  making the  transition, reform the old  system by  downsizing
benefits, raising retirement age and penalties for early retirement, tightening
eligibility for disability  benefits, and changing  the indexation  method to price
indexation, so the outstanding  debt, whether  implicit or  explicit, will  be
smaller.  Chile, Argentina and Uruguay  followed this strategy, which may  be
indispensable to a good pension reform. Otherwise, you run the risk of casting
in stone benefit promises that never should have been made in the first place,
and making it more difficult thai  before for  the government to escape from these
unrealistic promises.
2. Build a pre-existing primary surplus in the general treasury, that can
be used to pay off part of the pension debt. Chile did this but most other
countries are burdened with fiscal deficits rather than surpluses.
3. If there is a pre-existing surplus in the social security system, use
it to pay off part of the debt. While the Latin systems generally did not have
a surplus, the  U.S. social security trust fund could  be used in this way, if the
U.S. were to make a transition.
114.  If some  public enterprises  are being privatized,  use  some of  the
proceeds to  pay off the  pension debt--a  cancellation of long term assets against
long term liabilities. This strategy is being followed by Peru.
5.  Keep some  workers, and their contributions, in the  old system. This  may
be accomplished by excluding some workers, such as the military or the police,
from  the new system (as  in  Chile), or  by making the  new system attractive mainly
to young workers  (as  in Argentina) or by giving all workers a choice but making
the opt-out provisions relatively unattractive. The latter strategy has been
followed by Colombia, Uruguay and Peru,  which have kept the  old system operating
side-by-side with the new. The serious danger is that, in order to solve an
immediate cash-flow problem, these countries have increased their  long term
implicit debt; this solution may turn out to be non-viable.
6. Retain part of the old system in a downsized and more redistributive
form,  as the  public pillar of the  new system, so  that some  of the revenue in-flow
continues. Argentina followed this strategy,  by utilizing a flat benefit in its
new public pillar,  rather than the narrower minimum pension guarantee as in
Chile. In  Argentina, about 60% of the total contribution is used to support the
flat  benefit. In addition.,  workers can choose  between a funded  and a PAYG option
for the second pillar. The inflow of funds to the first pillar and the PAYG
second  pillar exceeds the outflow in the short run, and the surplus helps to  pay
the compensatory pension. But if the public pillar or PAYG second pillar offer
benefits that are too generous  (actuarially  unsound), the reform will not be
sustainable in the long run--a danger that Argentina faces.
7.  Reduce  evasion  and  increase  coverage,  thereby  increasing  system
revenues. This  was  part of  Argentina's  plan; however,  as  noted below, the reduced
evasiorn  has not yet materialized.
8. Issue recognition bonds that place a value on the debt owed to each
worker but that cannot  be cashed  urntil  the  worker retires (as  in  Chile).  Or, even
better, promise a compensatory  pension that will gradually be paid off over the
entire retirement period of the worker (as  in Argentina)  . Both of these methods
acknowledge the debt to  the worker  but  postpone the  day when cash  will be needed.
12The issuance  of the  recognition  bonds  gives  the worker  greater certainty  that  the
pension debt will eventually be repaid, since it is a legally binding piece of
paper, and in return for reducing uncertainty the government can downsize the
face value of the bond (as  in Peru).
9. Issue general treasury debt to cover the remaining cash gap. Some of
this debt may be sold to the pension funds in the new second pillar and some of
it may be external (as  in the World Bank's loan to Mexico). Debt finance is an
alternative to tax finance and has been used by virtually every reforming Latin
country, so that a heavy double burden of contributions is not imposed on the
transition generation of  workers. The  most important  proviso is that the  pension
funds must not be compelled to purchase the bonds, which therefore must pay the
market  interest  rate.  (However, all  Latin  countries  limit  international
diversification,  which  virtually  ensures  large  investments  in  domestic  government
bonds). A second important proviso is that a credible mechanism for eventually
paying  off this debt through taxation must be  identified, or the object  of
increasing national saving will not be achieved, as additional private saving
will be offset by additional  public dissaving.  The redemption  of the debt can  be
spread over a long period of time--but the longer the pay-off the slower the
country will receive the benefits of increased national saving for productive
investment. It has been estimated that the debt would be paid off in China by a
payroll tax rate of about 1.5% for 100 years (Friedman,  et al 1996) and in the
U.S. by a consumption tax of 1i for 70 years (Gramlich  1996).
10. Educate  the  public so  that they  understand  why change is  both  necessary
and desirable, for them and for the economy as a whole. Chile  was the role  model
in  this  respect, as the minister  responsible for the reform  carried on  an
extensive public relations campaign.
The danger for the Latin countries, especially those that plan to keep
their old systems operating for  many years, is that  the reform on paper will not
become a reform in practice, because of their desire to limit the transitional
financing gap by slowing down entry to the new system.  Workers continue to
13accumulate credits  under the old system,  which may not be actuarially sound, and
administrative costs mount as two systems are run simultaneously.
Closely related to the financing  gap is  the political opposition to reform
that stemmed from entrenched interests in large public pillars in some of the
Latin countries.  Bureaucrats  and unions  that  helped to run  the  old system did not
want to phase  it out. Maintaining large parts of their old system served to
palliate opponents  of pension reform  and therefore  facilitated  passage of reform
leaislation. But  it also means  that the benefits of a  full reform are not
received. A fuller description of these problems and solutions in the Latin
American countries can be found in  Valdes-Prieto 1997. This model is also under
active consideration in  Hungary and Poland,  and is  one of three options proposed
by the Social Security Advisory Committee in the United States--but has not yet
been adopted outside the Latin region.
The partial European model: notional DC plans or voluntary funded plans.
In fact, countries with large  public pil].ars  and implicit pension debts, such as
those in  Eastern  and Western  Europe,  are finding  it  exceedingly difficult to  make
the transition to a partially funded system with a mandatory private pillar--in
part because of the  financing  problem  but  also  because of the  political interests
associated  with existing  institutions.  This  explains  the  third  group of  reforming
countries--the  "partial" European  reformers,  that  feature  notional  defined
contribution plans or large tax incentives for voluntary funded plans.
The notional account system  was  pioneered by Sweden, although the recently
elected government has suspended adoption. It was passed but implementation has
been stalled in Italy. In both cases,  a large  notional pillar is supplemented  by
a  small  (2%) funded pillar.  The  system was also  adopted  and  is now  being
implemented  by  Latvia,  which hopes  to save  enough  money from  reducing evasion and
early retirement to start a substantial funded  pillar as its next step. Outside
of Europe, China has a notional defined contribution system, de facto. While in
principle China wants to start a second pillar made up of funded individual
accounts,  it has  been  unable  thus  far  to  finance  the  transition,  so  the
individual  accounts that  have  been set  up  in  many cities  remain largely  notional.
14A notional defined contribution plan is one in which the worker has an
individual  account  that  is  credited  with  his  contributions  plus  interest.
However, the accumulation is notional rather than actual, since the money paid
in by workers is immediately  paid out to pensioners rather than being invested;
i.e.  the  system  remains PAYG. This  system captures  some of  the  advantages
described above of linking benefits actuarially to contributions within each
cohort  (especially  the  reduction  in  intra-cohort  inequities  and  early
retirement).
However, it does not capture the benefits of funding, since there are no
funds. That is, intergenerational transfers remain and saving is not augmented.
In addition, as populations age, either the contribution rate would have to
increase or the benefits and notional rate of return would have to decrease for
newer cohorts, to keep the system solvent in the absence of investment income.
In either case, incentives for evasion would be strong, stemming from a high
contribution rate and/or a notional rate of return that is less than the real
market  return.  Nevertheless,  the  notional  defined  contribution  system  is
attractive to countries that have very large implicit  pension debts, especially
those that are unwilling to incur an explicit fiscal deficit to pay off these
obligations and those that, for political reasons, do not want to develop new
institutions tied to privately managed funds.
Finally, as another example of a partial  structural reform, the Czech
Republic has instituted large tax incentives  to  encourage workers to start their
own fur±ded  DC retirement plans on a voluntary basis. Other countries are also
considering this approach. However, international experience indicates that,
unless  pressed through  collective  bargaining  by  powerful  unions,  voluntarism  will
cost the government lost tax revenues but the retirement accounts are likely to
remain small and coverage very incomplete.
Thus, many  countries around the world are  seeking to diversify  their
sources of retirement income  away from  pure reliance  on publicly managed PAYG DB
systems, arid  some are succeeding,  but those with large pension debts are having
a hard time managing the transition to a substantial funded pillar. The major
15lesson for developing countries--avoid going down the PAYG road, because it is
very difficult to reverse later on.
IV. Growth Effects of Old Age Systems: How Large Are They?
The chief theoretical argument for the recommended multi-pillar system is
that it will have a positive effect on efficiency and growth, because the old
system introduced or failed to remove  distortions that  will be eliminated by the
reforms.  A  secondary  argument  is  that  it  will  enhance  the  financial
sustainability of the old age system and thereby provide better protection for
the old in the long run.
Growth effects are notoriously difficult to quantify and prove, in part
because relatively little  experience and  data are available and in  part because,
even if we had the data, it would be difficult to build models that capture all
the complex  dynamic  interactions; that  is, it  is difficult  to  specify  the
counter-factual. Pension reform  has several different  potential growth effects;
usually studies  focus on one of these while  ignoring or holding  the others
constant. For  example, general equilibrium models that analyze labor supply
effects typically  assume  away direct  increases in  saving,  and  vice versa. In  this
section I summarize the limited research that has been done on these topics,
concentrating  on  the  simulated growth  effects  in  countries  that have  been
considering structural reforms and econometric  estimation of the actual effects
in  the few countries that already have a  track record.  The papers at  this
conference advance this research agenda further.  This section also outlines the
many uLLmeasured  effects that rernain  to be investigated.
While  measuring  growth effects  of pension  reform  is problematic,  the
available  evidence indicates  that  they  are  positive,  possibly  large,  and  probably
the financial sustainability of the system has also improved.
Reduced labor  market distortions, evasion,  escape to the informal sector.
One problem in PAYG  DB systems is  the possibility that the high payroll tax will
lead to labor market distortions. In projections for the U.S., Feldstein and
16Samwick  (1996)  estimate that, in steady state, a fully funded DC system would
reduce  the  deadweight  loss  from  the payroll  tax  (stemming from  distorted
decisions  about labor  force participation, hours worked, choice  of job  and
location, degree of effort, form of compensation,  etc.) by 2.5% of covered  wages
or 1% of GNP annually. After taking into account transition costs, the long run
reduction in deadweight loss is 1.6% of covered wages or .6W of GNP annually.
This  may be compared with a projected exogenous  annual growth rate in real wages
of  1% per year.
The large size of the efficiency gain stems from the fact that capital
accumulation and investment income in the funded DC pillar reduces the required
payroll tax rate by 10.4 percentage points and this payroll tax came on top of
an already high income  tax; thus the  estimated labor  market distortions from the
present system are substantial. F&S assume a relatively low target benefit rate
which reduces the efficiency loss under the old system but they also assume a
full shift to funding, rather than a partial shift as in a multi-pillar system,
whiclh  increases the share of this loss that is eliminated under the new system.
In a separate study of the U.S. situation, using different assumptions,
Kotlikoff finds a 4% gain in potential consumption for all generations if a
system that features a low benefit-tax linkage is replaced by one with a high
linkage  and the  transitior is  financed  by a consumption  tax (Kotlikoff  1996).  The
difference between Kotlikoff's and F&S  numbers, demonstrates the sensitivity of
these results to key assumptions.  Kotlikoff does not assume investment income
that reduces the total required tax  rate nor does he assume that national saving
has increased,  but simply assumes that at the  margin the labor tax is reduced so
the efficiency of labor supply decisions improves. The gain disappears if a
distortionary income tax is used to finance the transition.
Are  these  numbers  from  the U.S.  applicable  to  developing  countries?
Developing countries that do not have large on-going social security systems
could move directly to the steady state without incurring transition costs, so
if they are considering establishing a PAYG DB system versus a fully funded DC
system, the  larger deadweight loss saving (2.5*  in F&S) would  be applicable. But
17many developing countries do not have effective income tax rates, implying a
smaller deadweight saving.  And  of course,  the  labor  supply  elasticities and rates
of return to capital might be different in developing countries. Most important
is the differential likelihood of evasion and escape to the informal sector.
In developing countries the  potential rate of evasion is high, leading to
a system  dependency rate  that far  exceeds  the  demographic  rate, a  higher required
contribution rate, and a misallocation of labor to the informal sector, where
productivity  is  lower.  The  existence of  the  informal  sector  increases  the
probability  that  high  taxes  will  be  evaded  by  changing  labor  allocation
decisions. Simulations of  hypothetical economies show  that a 15t  payroll tax may
induce a shift of 30% ot the labor force to the informal sector, reducing GNP
growth by 1% annually (Corsetti  1994; Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel 1997).
In  Avertincr  we argued that funded  DC plans are less likely to be evaded by
escape  to  the  informal  sector  because  they  closely  link  benefits  to
contributions.  While this seems reasonable, we cannot be sure that this will
happen in the real world. For example, myopic workers may continue to evade
contributions because they  will  not be able  to  access their  mandatory savings for
many  years. In  periods when investment  returns are  low,  workers may  be especially
tempted to evade, preferring to consume or to invest in education, housing or
consumer durables. If the payroll tax for pensions is only a small part of the
total payroll tax, the incentive to escape to the informal sector may remain
strong. Also, access to a minimum pension guarantee in the first  pillar may lead
workers to take a job where they need not report their income once they qualify
for the  guarantee. Indeed,  preliminary  evidence  from  Argentina and  Chile  suggests
that evasion  has not  gone down  much since  the  new system  was established (Valdes-
Prieto 1997). However, it is difficult to be conclusive about this, because it
is difficult to separate evasion from normal labor force withdrawals.
If escape to the informal sector occurs in a funded DC plan it does not
have the same negative effects on system sustainability that it does in a PAYG
DB plan, since the costs are simply borne by the evader in the form of lower
benefits,  rather  than being  passed  on  to  others  in  the  form of  a  higher
18contribution rate. This is a big plus. Nevertheless, it still creates the same
problem for  labor allocation  and  productivity and  an even  greater  problem for the
financial security of the evading workers who may not have an adequate pension
and may become a charge on the  public treasury when they grow oldl.  So we need to
watch the data on evasion carefully,  and countries  need to continue to  modernize
their information and tax collecting svstems, as a part of the reform.
On balance, it seems that the shift to a partially funded multi-pillar
system is likely  to reduce labor  market  distortions in developing countries  much
less than F&S's estimates, but even if  the efficiency gain were only 25% as high
(.6% of covered wages per year), this would still be large relative to other
instruments that the government could use to achieve the same goal.
Augmented retirement age.  A second source of inefficiency in PAYG defined
benefit systems is  that, in  the short  run  and during  periods of unemployment they
tempt politicians  to promise workers an  early retirement age with  generous
benefits, and this is difficult to reverse in the long run. Workers may prefer
an extra year's wage to an extra year of leisure,  but the  high contribution rate
that does Inot  yield commensurate benefits and the high pension that is paid for
by others may lead them to retire. We expect that fully funded DC plans will
mitigate  this  effect,  because  if  the  worker  retires  early  the  costs  are
internalized--her own pension is reduced. Thus she has an incentive to continue
working to raise her lifetime income. This in turn will increase the supply of
experienced labor in the economy and will improve  welfare. For example, suppose
that the reform eventually leads workers to raise their own retirement age by 4
years, and that leisure is worth, on average, half their productivity and wage
during that  period. Then, the  supply  of  labor  and  GNP (assuming  constant  marginal
productivity of labor)  are both  raised  almost 10%  and  welfare is  raised  about 5%.
Again this seems reasonable, but we do not know for sure that it will
happen. Perhaps the new system will be  so cost-effective in other ways that
workers will spend some of their increased income on leisure, taken in the form
of early retirement. This still increases welfare but it may not increase GNP.
The impact on growth remains to  be tested empirically. But the impact on system
19sustainability  must  be  positive, since  those  workers  who continue to  retire  early
pay the price in the form of a reduced pension, rather than becoming a drain on
the finances of the pool.
Increased long term  national saving.  A major rationale for pension reform
that emphasizes fully funded plans is that it will increase long term national
saving. When a country without a prior PAYG system institutes a multi-pillar
system, consumption will decrease and saving will increase if the mandatory
saving rate exceeds the voluntary rate. When a country with an existing PAYG
system replaces it with a multi-pillar system, national  saving increases  if
benefits are cut or taxes are increased, usually to cover transition costs. In
both cases, putting part of the contribution into the worker's own mandatory
saving  account may  be  a more  politically  acceptable and  less  economically
distortionary way of  achieving this  goal than  requiring  a high tax  rate that goes
into the general treasury. Furthermore, in both cases the recommended multi-
pillar system reduces the probability that governments will have to borrow to
cover  escalating  pension  costs  as  populations  age.  And  if  the  new  system
increases growth because of its labor  market effects, some the growth will feed
back  into  saving.  These  savings  then  become  a  further  source  of  growth--
empirically we observe that most savings stay in the country of origin and most
of a country's productive investment comes from its own saving, despite  the
global capital markets that supposedly prevail. The increase in saving and GNP
growth is welfare-enhancing (or  Pareto-optimal) if the initial saving rate was
sub-optimal due to  public  or private  myopic  or to a  tax-wedge  between private and
social returns to investment.
But  again,  there  are  reasons  why  this  increased  saving  might  not
materialize. For example,  mandatory saving  may not increase total  private saving
if  individuals  find ways  to  offset them against  other voluntary  saving or
accumulated  assets.  With  perfect  capital  markets, private  saving will  not
increase at all, since  people will simply borrow  against their mandatory pension
saving. A  positive  saving effect ultimately depends  on the assumption  that
voluntary long term saving and assets are small and borrowing opportunities
20limited for  substantial groups within  the population. The  limited borrowing
condition  probably  holds  for  most  developing  countries.  Simulations  of  a
representaLive economy indicate  that a tax-financed  transition to  a fully funded
system in the presence of credit constraints will increase output by 22* and
welfare by 16% (Cifuentes  and Valdes-Prieto 1997).
It is also possible that  public dissaving will increase if the  build-up of
pension reserves make it easier for  governments to run larger deficits. This is
particularly  likely to be the case for countries that have a large implicit
pension debt that must somehow  be covered to  make the  pension transition. If the
transition is fully financed by borrowing, even in the long run, government
dissaving will offset private saving, and the expected increase in national
saving will simply not transpire. On the other hand, if it is financed through
taxes or  cutbacks in other government expenditures, public  saving increases
national saving further (but  the tax hikes may have a distortionary effect on
labor markets, as noted above).
What does the  empirical evidence show?  Referring first  to the study by F&S
discussed above, they attribute the 10.4*  drop in the required contribution rate
and the consequent reduction in  deadweight loss to increased pension saving and
the investment returns on this saving. Initially the payroll tax increases by
about 1i to help build up the individual accounts while holding total benefits
constant. In the long run the payroll tax falls by 10.4%, to 2%, while holding
benefits constant.  This is  possible  because  the  accumulated  tax increments in  the
early years, plus the accumulated interest, increases the capital stock enough
to  generate as  much retirement income  as  would a 10.4%  payroll tax--4.2% of  GNP--
while still maintaining the new higher level of capital stock. Thus the young
consume less at first, but consuAme  more later on because the GNP pie has grown.
In F&S, the capital stock grows rapidly and substantially because  they
assume a  high real 9%  rate  of return,  which reflects  their estimation  of the full
marginal productivity of capital before the corporate income tax is paid. This
is a  higher  long run return thdn most analysts would use.  (Although it  is
unlikely that  pension funds will earn 9% in the long run, it is  well to remember
21that private returns may be less than social returns due to taxes, and these
augmented tax revenues should somehow be included in welfare calculations of
pension reform). Also, they seem to assume that  voluntary saving  will not be cut
back as the funded  accounts  grow  and  give increased  credibility to  their expected
future pension benefits.
Other studies have assumed partial crowd-out. In planning its mandatory
occupation scheme, Australia assumed 50% crowd-out and higher for workers who
already were covered by voluntary occupational plans. This implied that, in the
long run, national saving would be increased by  1.5% of GDP, thereby almost
doubling the current net national saving rate which is 2.2% of GDP.  (The  gross
national  saving  rate  is about  15%  of GDP).  Australia,  of  course,  had  the
advantage that the government did not have to borrow to pay off a pension debt
since the  second pillar  was an add-on  rather than a  diversion of  previous
contributions. Although  initially the tax-deductibility of contributions was
projected  to cause some government dissaving, in the long run the decreased
burden  on  the means-tested public pension  is expected to reduce  government
dissaving. One of the main effects of the  reform may be to shift the allocation
of private saving away from home ownership, which is now the predominant form
because of tax inducements, and toward other more productive forms. However,
these  simulations,  like  those  mentioned  below,  are  highly  sensitive  to
assumptions about future rates  of interest,  wage growth and coverage, as  well as
the degree of crowd-out (Bateman  and Piggott 1997).
In  his simulations  for  Mexico,  Ayala (1996)  assumes  a 30-40%  rate of crowd-
out. It the transition is tax-financed or if it is debt-financed and Ricardian
equivalence holds  (so  that private saving goes up to offset public dissaving),
total saving goes up  .4%-2.1% of GDP per year, compared with  current gross
national saving of about 14% of GDP. But if the transition is debt-financed and
Ricardian equivalence does  not hold, the impact  on total  saving is  much smaller,
even  negative in  some  years, although  positive  over-all  during the  next 30  years.
As in Kotlikoff's work, this underscores the importance of using taxation, and
choosing  the  right  tax,  to  pay  off  the pension  debt.  Projections  for  the
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a long run  increase in labor productivity and output of  1-4%, depending on
assumptions, due to increased capital formation; the supply of labor and labor
allocation are held constant in his model.
The only two countries that have had a mandatory saving plan long enough
for saving effects to be estimated  are Switzerland and Chile. In Switzerland the
national saving rate rose from 6 to 8.5W of GDP in the decade after the funded
second  pillar became mandatory and the entire increase  occurred in  pension funds
and related institutions such as insurance companies (Hepp  1997).
Regressions  by Corsetti  and Schmidt-Hebbel (1997)  attribute  half of the  21
percentage point decline in the private consumption ratio 1971-92 to the growth
of Chile's funded pension plans and related developments such as capital  market
deepening.  According to regression  analyses  by Haindl  Rondonelli (1996),  pension
reform played a major role in increasing the  national saving rate in Chile from
16.7% of GDP pre-reform (1976-80)  to 26.6%  post-reform (1990-94)  . Specifically,
pension saving  accounts for  two-thirds  of the increase--6.6  out of  9.9  percentage
points--even after taking account of crowd-out, which is estimated to be small,
largely because  of borrowing  constraints. A more modest  positive  effect on
private saving, 4% of GNP by 1994, was found by Agosin, Crespi and Letelier
(1996);  voluntary saving  apparently  did  not decline  as  mandatory saving increased
because households had little voluntary saving to begin with. A  significant
positive  effect of  the pension reform on national  saving was also  found by
Morande (1996).  But the growth  of consumer  credit,  possibly as the result of the
pension reform, could increase  consumer dissaving  and offset some  of these  gains
in the future (Holzmann  1996).
While  some analyses  focus  on  enhanced private  saving,  other  studies
emphasize the impact  of  pension reform  on public saving  and dissaving. Chile had
to finance  a  pension transition,  in  part through  deficit finance--which  decreased
national saving. The fiscal costs of the transition largely cancelled out the
positive effect on private saving initially (Agosin  et al 1996). However, these
fiscal costs are short run  while the increased  private saving  may persist in the
23long  run. In addition,  Chile  accumulated  a large  budgetary  surplus  ex ante in
preparation  for  the  reform,  thereby  reducing  its  need  for  deficit  finance.  And
it continued  to exercise  fiscal  discipline  in other areas after  the reform,
possibly  to  facilitate  the  pension  transition.  By  the  early  1990's  the  government
budget  was  running  a surplus.  While  we do  not  know  how  large  this  surplus  would
have been otherwise,  to the degree  that the pension reform  was financed  by
cutting  public  consumption,  its  positive  effect  on  national  saving  is  reinforced.
Given  the  high  correlation  between  pension  saving  and  other  aspects
of economic  change, the controversy  surrounding  the determinants  of private
saving  (e.g.  which  variables  are  endogenous?),  and  the  even  greater  uncertainty
about  the  determinants  of  public  saving  and  dissaving  (e.g.  what  is  the  counter-
factual?), these  econometric results must  be  very  sensitive to  model
specification  and  the  topic  clearly  requires  additional  research.  Nevertheless,
preliminary  evidence  indicates  that  pension  reform  can  have  beneficial  effect  on
long term  national  saving  rates-  -increasing  them  by 10 to 30% of the ex ante
gross rates  and sometimes  over 50% of the ex ante  net rates--providing  it is
accompanied  by a broader  set of policies  designed  to constrain  consumer  and
government  borrowing,  including  borrowing  associated  with  transition  costs.
Financial market development. One reason for favoring private management
of pension funds is that this will develop a set of financial institutions--
investment managers,  insurance companies, and banks--that are  essential  for
economic development.  On the  one  hand, a  funded  pillar cannot  get  started without
some  minimum financial  market capacity,  but  on the  other  hand, the funded  pillar,
if competitively  managed and  well-regulated,  can  be instrumental in  enabling the
financial market to grow in safety, size, depth and complexity. In developing
countries, where private saving is already high, one of the main effects of a
funded pillar may be to shift these savings out of land and jewelry and into
financial market investments that  are  better for  the broader economy, because of
the development of these financial institutions.
Even in Australia it is expected that the financial  market will grow as a
result of  the mandatory  second pillar. For example, as noted earlier,  some
24private saving  may  be redirected  out  of  owner-occupied  housing  into  the financial
markets. Insurance companies are expanding, developing a new line of products,
including  annuity  products, to  meet the  anticipated  demand stemming from  pension
funds  (Bateman and  Piggott 1997).  In Switzerland also, growth  of  the  life
insurance industry, investment companies and mutual funds, have been spurred by
mandatory  funded pension plans. And  corporate governance has been  gradually
changing,  as  institutional  investors  have  demanded  disclosure  and  better
performance  (Hepp  1997).
But the strongest evidence for this expected growth  effect comes  from
Chile. During the five years preceding the adoption of its new system, Chile
prepared  the groundwork by  organizing a primary  market  for treasury bonds,
reforming  its  laws  governing  mutual  funds,  corporations  and  securities,
privatizing  banks,  authorizing  a  price-indexed  mortgage  bond  market  and
liberalizing the provision of insurance and reinsurance  (Valdes-Prieto 1997).
After the new system was introduced, this process continued--financial markets
became more liquid as the number of traded shares on the stock market and their
turnover increased;  demand  was created  for  the  equities  of  newly  privatized state
enterprises;  information  disclosure  and  credit-rating  institutions  developed;  the
variety  of  financial  instruments  including indexed  annuities, mortgage  and
corporate  bonds  grew;  and  asset  pricing improved.  Econometric  analysis  shows that
financial market deepening induced by the reformed pension system  (and other
factors  with  which  this  was  closely  correlated)  increased  total  factor
productivity 1% per year, or half of the increase in total factor  productivity,
in Chile (Holzmann 1996).
Two issues  for further  research:  1. Mandatory  personal  saving  plans  versus
mandatory  occupational  plans.  The growth  impact  of saving  depends  in part  on how
productively it is invested. As discussed above, the big advantage of private
over public investment is the likelihood that private  management will produce a
better allocation of capital. The evidence indicates  that private management is
indeed  able to choose a more diversified  portfolio  with higher returns, although
ubiquitous constraints on international investments constrain this somewhat.
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pillar have emerged--personal saving plans, where workers choose the investment
manager (as  in the  Latin  American model),  and  occupational  plans, where  employers
and/or union representatives, make the choice  (as in the OECD model). Which
produces a better allocation of capital, higher investment returns, and lower
administrative costs? This needs further research.
On the  one hand,  preliminary  evidence from  Chile indicates  that  workers are
ill-informed, do not make decisions based on investment returns, that pension
funds incur high marketing costs to lure them, and that regulations designed to
safeguard the workers lead  to inefficient investment  strategies, such  as herding
behavior. On the  other  hand, the Chilean  AFP's have earned  an average real  return
of over 12% gross, and over 9% net of costs, since the inception of the new
system, which compares favorably with returns over this period in most other
countries (check  these numbers).
On a  priori grounds  we might expect that occupational  plans would have the
advantages of economies  of scale in  decision-making,  greater financial  expertise
of  the  decision-makers, and  lower regulatory and marketing  costs. However,
occupation plans open the door to financial abuse and more general principal-
agent  problems,  as  employers  or  union  representatives  make  the  investment
decision while  workers bear the risk.  Employers  might choose investment  managers
or strategies that benefit them, at the cost of lower returns to their workers.
For example, in Switzerland employers tend to choose banks with which they have
had  long-standing  financial  relationships,  in  a  relatively  non-competitive
environment  (Hepp  1997). A separation of decision-making from risk-bearing may
lead to outcomes that aje off the risk-return efficiency frontier. An extreme
case of employer misallocation is exemplified by the Maxwell  scandal and an
extreme case  of  worker  misinformation  by  the  insurance  company  misrepresentations
that led workers to purchase financially disastrous policies, both of these in
the U.K. (Johnson 1997).
In situations where workers are mobile or move in and out of the labor
force, an occupational plan may leave them with many small costly accounts,
26plans, while a personal saving plan would automatically be carried with them
regardless of their current employer. This is a problem in  Australia, which has
a  mandatory  occupational  scheme,  and  potentially  in  Hong  Kong,  which  is
considering this system. These high administrative costs reduce the resources
available for  productive investment and consumption.  We could certainly benefit
from careful empirical studies in this under-researched area.
2.  Financial  market  response to  the trade-off  between implicit  and explicit
debt.  As discussed above,  when a  country  makes a  pension transition it  trades off
part of its implicit debt for explicit debt. This in itself can have an impact
on economic growth because of the response of financial markets--a topic that
requires further research. If the implicit debt were legally binding and known
to all, a  transition that converts an  implicit debt to an explicit debt by
conversion  into government  bonds  should have  virtually no  financial market
effect. However, the implicit debt is  by its  nature  more ambiguous,  with greater
uncertainty  about how much will  eventually repaid. In some  countries  (e.g.
Argentina) courts have upheld  implicit public pension promises as a legally
enforceable  property right,  but in  other countries (e.g.  the U.S.) they have not
done  so  and  even  in Argentina  the government has  not yet  paid  the  court-
determined  amounts.  Moreover,  until  recently  most  people,  including  most
financial analysts, were not even aware of the basic magnitude of the implicit
debt in most countries.
Given this situation, it is possible that the financial markets will have
a negative reaction when the explicit  debt goes up, even if offset by a decline
in the implicit debt, and this in turn could have a negative impact on economic
growth. The debt becomes more codified, and its large size a matter of public
information.  Interest rates  could rise  in response, and  this would  have  a
chilling effect on productive investment. Interest rates could also rise  if
creditors are mainly concerned about the default risk associated with bonds and
believe  that in the past bonds had priority over social security debt--then
mixing the two together in the form of explicit debt would  increase the risk
premium.
27On the other  hand, countries  could use the conversion  as an opportunity to
reduce  the  implicit  debt--cutting the  face  value in  return for  greater certainty.
And  if creditors  think that social security obligations  are protected  from
default, eliminating  the  implicit pension  debt gives  them more  protection.
Further, financial markets could be reassured that the new system will prevent
the debt from escalating further in the future. In these cases, interest rates
might actually fall when implicit debt is swapped for explicit debt during the
transition.
I  do not  know  of  any careful  empirical study  of  this  issue, but  my
impression  is  that  the  financial markets  did not  react  negatively  in  the
reforming Latin American countries.
Summary. In sum, a small but growing body of empirical evidence indicates
that  pension reform has  produced positive growth effects.  That is, the impact on
saving, productivity, output  and welfare may  be high  relative to  exogenous
sources of growth in these variables (see  Table 2 for a summary).
Several  caveats  are  essential  in  interpreting  this  evidence. First,  because
it  is  difficult  to  specify  the  counter-factual,  these  results  are  highly
sensitive to the assumptions that are made, and each study typically contains a
different set of assumptions. In particular, the econometric analyses for Chile
are subject to omitted variable bias and the simulation results depend heavily
on assumptions about crowd-out and rates of return. Second, they also depend
heavily on key policy decisions, such as the question of how high the required
contribution rate  and target benefit rate  will be, what proportion of the multi-
pillar system should be funded and DC, and how the transition will be financed.
While debt finance may be necessary for political purposes some degree of tax
finance is necessary to meet the economic objectives, and of course some taxes
have  better efficiency  properties than  others.  Third,  it  is important  to  remember
that,  even if it claims to use a general  equilibrium model, each study typically
deals with only one possible source of  growth, so that  many of these results are
additive--that is, the total  growth effect is the sum  of the separate effects on
labor market  distortions, early  retirement, escape to  the  informal  sector,
28capital accumulation, financial market development and other sources  of growth.
So if each separate  effect increases  GDP in  amounts ranging  from L-10%,  their sum
may increase GDP 10-30%.
Finally,  in situations where we do not have evidence that reform has
enhanced growth, as with respect to evasion and early retirement, it appears
likely that it has enhanced the financial sustainability of the pension system,
as the  funded  DC  pillar expressly  requires  individuals  to internalize  these costs
rather than passing them on to others.
V. Conclusion
Averting the Old Age Crisis argued that old age security systems with a
large  funded  defined  contribution  component,  decentralized  competitive  management
of these funds, and a social safety net, are most likely to promote economic
growth, provide acceptable income  to  the  old, including  the  old  with low lifetime
incomes, and reduce risk  by diversification.  These recommendations  were based on
an  arlalysis  of the  problems observed  in  pay-as-you-go  defined  benefit systems  and
publicly managed funded systems, as well as  our expectations, based on economic
theory,  about how the proposed new  system would work.  We also drew  on  the
experience of the very limited  number of countries that  had already experimented
with the proposed multi-pillar system.
Since  the  publication  of  Averting,  the  move toward  multi-pillar  systems  has
accelerated around the  world, spurred  by  the  same  demographic and  economic forces
that pushed us in that direction. With the aging of the world's population, it
has become increasingly important  to  choose a reliable  and cost-effective  method
of old-age support. With economic growth slowing down in many countries and
financial markets opening up globally, it has become increasingly important to
raise productivity through improved incentives in the labor market and through
the accumulation of capital which is then allocated to its most efficient uses.
Where income disparities have widened, it has become increasingly important to
provide additional protection to low wage-earners who have grown old. A  multi-
29pillar system that includes a mandatory publicly managed tax-financed defined
benefit pillar for redistribution, a mandatory  privately managed funded defined
contribution pillar  to manage  peoples' retirement  savings,  and a  voluntary
pillar, possibly  tax-advantaged, for people who are willing to pay  for more
security, seems most likely to accomplish these objectives. Thus several Latin
American and OECD countries have already adopted multi-pillar systems, and they
are under serious consideration in Eastern Europe, East Asia and the U.S.
However,  countries  with  a  large  implicit  pension  debt  and  with  an
accompanying set of traditional social security institutions are having trouble
overcoming  political  opposition  and  financing  the  transition.  Developing
countries are fortunate in that they are at a relatively early stage and can
choose a preferred multi-pillar  system almost from the  start, before  these
obstacles arise.
Also during the last two years new research has been carried out on some
of  the  critical assumptions  underlying the  recommendations in Averting.  In
particular,  the  effects  of  a  full  or  partial  shift  to  a  funded  defined
contribution plan  on  labor  supply and  its allocation,  national  saving  and
financial market development have begun to be quantified, both  in simulated
projections  for  countries  that  are  or  were  investigating  reform  and  in
econometric or descriptive analyses for countries that already have reformed.
Evidence  from  the United  States, Australia, Switzerland,  the U.K.,  Mexico,
Argentina and Chile supports  the existence  of  positive growth effects, sometimes
in large quantities.  While these empirical investigations  are still at an early
stage,  it  appears  that countries  that  are concerned  about  growth should  seriously
consider using pension reform as a potentially powerful tool, to improve the
well-being both of the old and the young.
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38Table  1: Implicit  Pension  Debt  During  the Early  1990s
IPD/GDP  s-  of  population
for  4t discount  rate  over  60 years  old
Senegal  27  4.3
Mali  26  4.9
Burkina  Faso  15  5.0
Venezuela  30  5.6
Peru  37  5.8
Cameroon  44  5.8
Congo  30  6.1
Brazil  187  6.7
Turkey  72  7.1
Albania  67  8.1
China  63  8.9
Uruguay  214  16.4
Croatia  350  17.8
Ukraine  141  18.7
Hungary  213  19.3
Source:  p.  38.  Finance  and Development/June  1996
Robert  Palacios  for Albania
Cheikh  Kane  for  Burkina  Faso,  Congo  and  Mali
39Table 2: The Growth Impact of Pension Reform
Country  Author  Size  Comparison
Increased output due to removal of labor market distortions
*U.S.  Feldstein  2.5%  covered wages or 1t of  projected exogenous real wage
GNP in steady state  growth is 1% per year
*U.S.  Kotlikoff  4% gain in consumption or
leisure for all generations
Increase in saving rate due to mandatory savinQ plan
*U.S.  Feldstein  saving increases 1% of  current rational saving rate =
covered wages or .4%  of GDP.
Annual output increases 4.it
of GDP in steady state
*Australia  Bateman &  1.5S of GDP in long run  current net national saving rate
Piggott  is 2.2% of GDP. Gross saving
rate is 15% of GDP
*Mexico  Ayala  .4 - 2.1% of GDP  current gross national saving =
14% of GDP
**Switzerland  Hepp  2.5% of GDP increase in  saving was 6% of GDP before
national saving rate after 10  pension reform, 8.5% after
years
**Chile  Haindl  6.6% of GDP after 14 years  gross saving was 16.7% of GDP
Rondonelli  pre-reform, 26.6% post-reform
Increased Productivity due to financial market development after pension reform
**Chile  Holzmann  1% per year increase in total  total increase in TFP was 2% per
factor productivity  year after pension reform
*  =  projected  before
reform
**  =  actual,  after
reform
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